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ABSTRACT
This dissertation follows the evolution of the European Union, from the first attempts to 
cooperate  and  attain  common  goals,  to  its  present  situation.  The  fundamental  principles  and 
objectives of the Union form the foundation of this thesis. Subsequently, the implications and the 
impact  of  the  financial  crisis,  which emerged to Europe,  led  to  a  severe  deterioriation  of  long 
established social rights and distrust to national governments and European Union institutions, as 
well. 
As it  addresses audiences that share an interest  in European monetary policy during the 
crisis, it  focuses on the case of the Greek debt restructuring and the private sector involvement 
(PSI), the levy that was imposed on Cypriot bank accounts and the passing of European legislation 
regulating the confiscation of depositors throughout the European Union, whenever a bank is in 
need for recapitalization and the bail-in of shareholders'  and bondholders'  is not sufficient.  The 
infringement of Constitutional provisions both in Greece and Cyprus through these interventions, 
mainly decided by the present leadership of the Union, is discussed. 
Moreover, there is an introduction of the related provisions to property right of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU (2000/C 364/01) and of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and the derogation of the European Union from its fundamental principals, values 
and objectives, as they are illustrated by the present status-quo in the Eurozone. The conclusive part 
of  this  dissertation  is  engaged  with  suggestions  for  harmonized  integration,  promotion  of 
democratic principles and activities, coordination of economies in the Eurozone and safeguarding of 
fundamental human rights.
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From cohesion to dilution: How far has the European Union reached or how much more does 
it have to accomplish?
1. INTRODUCTION
The unification of countries in Europe into a political and an economic institution, such as 
the European Union (EU) as it has evolved over the years up until  now, has been an enduring 
ambition and a commitment for many decades. This recurring project was set forth in the late 1960s 
and since then has passed through different stages, depending on the historic events of each period. 
Particularly the process of the monetary unification and the adoption of a single currency for the 
Member States of the EU (which through the various phases has been addressed with different 
names),  under the auspices and the permanent control of one banking institution,  the European 
Central Bank (ECB), is a phenomenon with interplaying economic and political characteristics.
It  is  commonly accepted that  the  monetary consolidation  had great  impact  in  economic 
policies, both in a european and global level, and has created new balances and trade relations, in 
quantity and in quality. One could say that the whole financial system has been placed into a new 
path. The  euro  has  largely  reduced  the  trade  costs  and  has  amplified  capital  movement.  The 
Member States have abnegated their own monetary policy, which was engaged in exchanging rates 
between currencies and it depended on different economic schemes. The differentiation in interest 
rates is now greatly constricted and the exchange rates are common for all the countries that have 
adopted the euro.  
The  ECB  designates  the  monetary  policy  for  the  Member  States,  that  constitute  the 
Eurozone, and is considered to be a dominant player in the operation of the global economy. The 
basic task of the ECB is to define and implement this monetary policy, with primarily one objective: 
to maintain price stability within its area, keeping inflation below but close to 2% over the medium 
term and preventing deflation.  So far,  the ECB has been very successful in  achieving its  main 
purpose,  since  it  has  kept  the  average  around  2%,  lower  than  the  average  standards  in  the 
Bundesbank1 era  for  Germany.  In addition,  the  ECB has  the legal  mandate  to  conduct  foreign 
exchange  operations,  to  guard  the  foreign  reserves  of  the  European  System of  Central  Banks 
(ESCB)2,  to  promote  smooth  operation  of  the  financial  market  infrastructure,  to  authorize  the 
1 The Deutsche Bundesbank is the central bank of the Federal Republic of Germany.
2 The ESCB comprises the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the EU Member States 
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issuance of euro banknotes, to monitor the banking sector and to contribute in maintaining a stable 
financial system. The eruptive increase of euro-denominated bonds, the alliances in national stock 
exchanges and the mergers of domestic bank institutions during the Euroarea have developed a true 
European financial market. 
Furthermore,  the  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU)  can  be  observed  from  a  political 
perspective  because  the  initiative  to  create  such a  union,  the  requirements  that  were  set  to  be 
fulfilled in order for one state to become a Member, the evolution of the EU institutions and the 
appointment  of  the  presiding  representatives  in  each  body  and  office  are,  mainly,  features  of 
political  nature.  Political  parties  and leaders  made these decisions  according to  their  respective 
national constitutional limitations and through parliamentary proceedings or through the conduct of 
referendums and they involved large scale negotiations and delegations. The development of this 
consolidation provides the ability to formulate and implement foreign, social and environmental 
policies on a European scale.
The monetary unification is an ongoing process, as it constantly evolves due to political 
changes in each Member State and the assimilation of the European integration on the way people 
think and live in this unified society, especially now that they are experiencing the dramatic changes 
that  came  into  view  with  the  emergence  of  the  financial  crisis.  The  economic  and  monetary 
consolidation has been a high priority for the related States in the EU's history because it appeared 
to be an environment that, eventually, would lead to expiation of hostility between coterminous 
nations,  it  would  enhance  political  and  financial  stability  and  it  would  guarantee  prosperity, 
employment and continuing growth for the countries involved and their population. But as it will be 
deployed later, political and economic obstacles, differentiation in the level of commitment to the 
completion of the Union, disagreement concerning the economic priorities and the patterns that 
should be followed, and the recent turbulence in the international financial and political field have 
created a frustrating framework for the EMU. 
2. THE ROAD TOWARDS THE EMU3 
The transition from individual states to the EMU and the Euroarea consists of four stages or 
phases. The turmoil in the markets by 1969 that led to the revaluation of the German mark and the  
devaluation of the French franc created a currency instability and jeopardized the common price 
3 The data of this section are drawn from the European Commission's website 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/emu/road/index_en.htm 
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system of the common agricultural policy of the European Community (EC), as it was then into 
force. 
a) PHASE 1: The Werner Report
During the post-war period the economic market field in Europe, North America and Japan 
was regulated by the Bretton Woods system, according to which, gold and the United States dollar 
provided the standards for all monetary transactions and secured a stable financial and currency 
framework.  Under  these  conditions,  the  Treaty  of  Rome  in  1957  had  nothing  to  contribute 
concerning the financial component, but further political progress was desired. The Barre Report in 
1969 set an economic and monetary union as first priority for the political leaders of Europe and a 
“High Level Group” was formed under Pierre Werner4 with the task to draft a report suggesting how 
this  union could be completed by 1980. The “Werner Report” was introduced in October 1970 
setting as basic objectives of the EMU the irreversible convertibility of currencies for the Member 
States, the creation of a stable exchange rates mechanism or a single currency, if possible and free 
capital  movement.  The  whole  process  would  comprise  coordination  of  economic  policies, 
commonly accepted frameworks for budgetary policies, management of reserves and interest rates 
control on a Community level, all set in a three stage process, eventually leading to the EMU.
b) PHASE 2: From the Werner Report to the European Monetary System (EMS) 
The effort to keep exchange-rate fluctuations in narrow margins considered as a prerequisite 
that the exchange-rate against the US dollar would remain stable, and when that failed in August 
1971, the Member States of the soon to be EMS, adopted the so called “snake in the tunnel”. This  
mechanism concerned  fluctuations of currencies (the snake)  of the countries participating,  inside 
narrow limits against the dollar  but it was a short-lived operation due to oil crises and austerity 
policies. In 1979 the EMS was introduced under the concept of stable and adjustable exchange-rates 
related to the newly adopted European Currency Unit (ECU).
c) PHASE 3: The Delors Report
The EMS retained its primary goal to keep exchange-rates stable for the sake of economic 
4  Prime Minister of Luxembourg at the time
12
Dissertation 2013 Ioannidou Stavroula
growth, the import of investments and the protection of trade, along with the decrease of inflation 
and its permanent control. The free movement of goods, services, capital and people was adopted in 
1985 with the European Commission's  White Report on the completion of the Internal market, 
which set  out the strategy of removing all  remaining barriers and would eventually lead to the 
desired single market. In 1988 a Committee for the study of economic and monetary unification was 
set up presiding Jacques Delors5, producing a report in April 1989, known as the Delors Report, 
which determined the monetary union goal as a full liberalization of capital movements, concise 
integration  of  financial  markets,  irreversible  convertibility of  currencies,  irrevocable  fixation of 
exchange-rates and the likely adoption of a single currency, replacing the old national currencies. 
d) PHASE 4: From Maastricht to the euro and the Euroarea 
A three-stage preparation period was recommended by the Delors report that was accepted 
by the European leaders.  The Treaty on the  EU was signed at  Maastricht6 in  1992,  where  the 
European Council was held and it set the “convergence criteria” to be fulfilled for any member state 
aspirant.  Ten years of preparations led to the launch of the euro on January 1999, whereas the 
establishment of the Euroarea and the operation of monetary policy forwarded to the ECB. The 
issuance of euro coins and banknotes took place on January 2002. It should be mentioned that while 
the convergence criteria were not always met, still, the leaders of the EU considered sufficient the 
fact that the candidate countries met the “spirit” of this unique creation. 
3. THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, VALUES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UNION
The Treaty on EU, as declared in Article A of the common provisions “marks a new stage in  
the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are  
taken as closely as possible to the citizen”.  The promotion of peace, the Union's values and the 
well-being  of  its  people,  the  advancement  of  economic  and social  progress  in  a  balanced and 
sustainable  manner,  the  assertion  of  the  Union's  identity  on  the  international  scene,  the 
strengthening of the Member States nationals' protection of rights and interests are introduced as 
fundamental  objectives  of  the  Union.  Furthermore,  the  reinforcement  of  economic  and  social 
5 Jacques Lucien Jean Delors (born 20 July 1925) is a French economist and politician, the eighth President of the 
European Commission (1985-1995) 
6 Known as the Maastricht Treaty (Official Journal 92/C 191/01)
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cohesion, the promotion of a high level of employment, the boost of scientific and technological 
advance,  sustainable  development  and protection  of  the  environment,  the  introduction  of  close 
cooperation on justice and home affairs and the maintenance of the “acquis communautaire” were 
aknowledged as equally important. 
Moreover, the Union is founded on certain values, which are common to the Member States. 
Respect  of  human dignity,  liberty,  democracy,  equality,  the rule  of  law,  fundamental  freedoms, 
human rights, including people belonging to minorities, has been of high importance throughout the 
evolution of the EU, as recorded to the Treaties of the Union7. All EU Member States societies are 
characterized by pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity, equality and non-discrimination; a State 
that does not honor these values cannot become an eligible candidate for admission. 
It  should  be  underlined  that,  in  several  points  of  the  Treaties,  the  European  leaders 
proclaimed their  desire  to  unify the Member States'  economies and to  ensure their  harmonious 
development, provided that concerted actions had to be taken so as to guarantee steady expansion, 
balanced trade  and fair  competition,  convergence  of  economic  performance,  affirming that  the 
essential objective of all this process and effort was and is the constant improvement of the living 
and working conditions of their people. The definition of the principles and the guidelines for the 
common foreign and security policy,  the decisions on common strategies,  the adoption of joint 
actions and common positions and the strengthening of systematic cooperation between Member 
States in the conduct of policy were set in order to obtain the aforementioned objectives. 
All in all the fundamental values, principles and the main objectives of the EU as reflected 
in the texts of the Treaties highlight the desire of the Member States and their citizens to create a  
common future, a common destiny while securing their national identities, history and particular 
elements, under the condition that they are mutually respected. 
4. THE DEBT CRISIS AND THE EU'S RESPONSE 
After the collapse of "Lehman Brothers”8 and before Greece's sovereign debt crisis, the EU 
did not apply a collective response to this situation, as the Maastricht Treaty had not anticipated 
such a mechanism. The EU institutions had the ability to draw precautionary measures, but no 
instruments for organizing immediate and efficient centralized operations were provided. The first 
7 http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm   
8 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. was a global financial services company. Prior its bankruptcy in 2008, Lehman was 
the fourth-largest investment bank in the USA.
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reactions concerned a combative wave of hostile political statements by European leaders against 
Greece, on its high and unsustainable budget deficits. Articles in the press suggesting that Greece 
should sell its islands or Acropolis and other ancient monuments were ordinary. Within a period of 
few months, an eruptive atmosphere had been cultivated among the European community.
The debt crisis, nevertheless, was not just a Greek case, as it appeared to be in the beginning. 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Italy faced a severe financial crisis, as well. Governments in Greece, 
Spain and Portugal adopted an austerity policy in an exertion to bring, by 2013, their public deficits 
within the 3 percent margin that the Stability and Growth Pact requested. Fierce measures were 
imposed on Greece in 2010 and with the mutual agreement of the EU, the International Monetary 
Fund9 (IMF) and the Greek government, such measures were expanded in a large scale, in order for 
Greece to be provided with a supportive package. Soon enough, austerity policy became a guide to 
peripheral countries, as well, though the adopted measures were different in character and extent. A 
Memorandum10, signed by the EU, IMF and the Greek government passed by the Greek Parliament 
in a compulsive manner, included clauses dictating that Greece would do everything necessary in 
order to achieve its financial balances; it also suggested measures regarding major cuts in public 
spending and whopping taxes and forced Greece to  adopt regimes for labour  market  that  were 
nowhere else to be found in the EU, along with a commitment to proceed in large privatizations. As 
declared in the preamble of the decision of Council “there is an extremely urgent need for Greece to  
take decisive action,  on an unprecedented scale...” and continues below that “The very severe  
deterioration of the financial situation of the Greek Government has led the euro area Member  
States to decide to provide stability support to Greece, with a view to safeguarding the financial  
stability  of  the  euro  area  as  a  whole...  The  lenders  have  decided  that  their  support  shall  be  
conditional on  Greece  respecting  this  decision.  Greece  is  expected  to  carry  out  the  measures  
specified in this Decision in accordance with the calendar set out herein”.
Similar but lighter measures were imposed on Spain and Portugal, while Spain chose to keep 
the intensity in low levels, in order to recover sooner from the deep recession that such a policy 
would surely generate. Portugal attended the path in between Greece and Spain. Nevertheless, all 
austerity measures addressed the sector of employment and it became apparent, even for a total  
unfamiliar, that the ultimate aim was not only to confine public spending, but to reduce significantly 
9 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an organization of 188 countries, working to foster global monetary 
cooperation, secure financial stability and reduce poverty around the world http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm
10 Memorandum for Greece is governed by a unique special status and the arrangement includes a loan facility 
agreement and the Council's Decision of 10/05/2010 by the EU, the law 3845/2010 by the Greek Parliament and the 
Stand by Arrangement by the IMF (“The Greek Memorandum in european, global and national legal order” by P. 
Glavinis, 2010 in page 82)
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the cost of labour in the public sector, in the foreground, and in the private sector consequently. 
Salaries and pensions decreased on an impressive level, laws on employment contracts and massive 
layoffs dramatically altered, severe augmentation of age limits in pension terms were introduced, 
placing, thus, the workforce in an unprecedented tough spot. The capital was largely facilitated and 
a redistribution of income was launched, on the burden of working people, while Greece, Portugal 
and Spain, the most unprivileged and unequal countries of the Eurozone are confronted with the 
consequences of the strategy selected by the aforementioned heads of the EU. 
5. THE GREEK DEBT RESTRUCTURING
a) GENERAL OVERVIEW
The large amounts of debt that certain EU countries accumulated over the years render the 
present financial status a sovereign debt crisis. The sustainability of these states' debt is a major 
concern for the free market and an event of default remains always a risk. It should be noted that the 
sovereign bonds market forms a significant funding source for the industrialized countries in the 
present financial reality. In the above mentioned situation of huge accumulated sovereign debt, it 
becomes apparent that investors eschew from purchasing bonds issued by these states.  
Regarding Greece, the supportive package that had been provided by the IMF and the EU 
proved  insufficient.  The  Greek  debt  needed  restructuring  and  the  Greek  government  had  to 
negotiate with its creditors in order to obtain a mutually accepted solution.
b) THE PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT (PSI)11 
The first PSI was agreed in July 2011, it concerned a 21% reduction of the Net Present Value 
of the Greek bonds and took place with a swap of old Greek bonds, that were replaced by new ones 
of longer maturity and medium coupons. This version of the PSI failed because: a) it  was only 
bonds maturing up to 2020 that were participating, leaving out 61 billion serving until 2057, b) the 
coupons granted on the new bonds remained high and provided no gain regarding the needs of 
Greece  for  direct  cash  flow,  3)  the  swap  had  a  voluntary  character,  sacrificing  therefore  the 
participation of the creditors and mainly 4) the ECB was excluded from this project. The reason 
why ECB was left from the scheme lies on the fact that it had obtained Greek bonds of 45-50 billion 
11 PSI Launch Press Release here http://www.minfin.gr/portal/en/resource/contentObject/id/7ad6442f-1777-4d02-
80fb-91191c606664 
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while striving to grant stability for the Greek bond market. If the ECB had participated in the PSI, it 
would bear losses that should be raised afterwards by its shareholders, the National Central Banks 
(NCBs) of the Member States of the Eurozone. Not only would such a situation result to a severe  
wound of the estimation of the ECB, but a great collection of taxpayers' money would be necessary, 
principally from countries of the North. On the other hand, ECB would violate Article 123 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU(TFEU)12 if it proceeded in printing money with the intent to 
bailout countries of the Eurozone. 
On October 2011 the representative of the Institute of International Finance13 (IIF), Charles 
Dallara,  was  forced  by the  EU’s  leadership  to  accept,  on  behalf  of  the  bondholders,  a  53,5% 
“haircut”14 in the face value of the Greek bonds. Mr. Dallara objected on the voluntary nature of 
such a large “haircut” but this didn't prevent the inevitable. The PSI+ included all the Greek bonds 
and insisted on the volitional nature because a compulsory restructuring would amount to an event 
of default. It was a manifest desire of the European leadership to avoid a Greek bailout burdening 
their taxpayers as well as a Greek default. The Commissioner Olie Rehn15 accurately stated “We all  
know what to do, we just don't know how to do it and get re-elected”. The replacement bonds were 
made up of a collection of short-dated bonds issued by  the European Financial Stability Facility 
(“EFSF”)16 and bonds governed  by  English law,  issued by Greece,  with longer  term maturities 
ranging between 11 and 30 years in length. 
One additional aspect of the arrangement provided that part of the money saved by the PSI, 
would be distributed to banks in order to recapitalize them, as they suffered great losses from the 
whole endeavor. With this manipulation the EU Council, in a way, bribed  the financial institutions 
so as to ensure their involvement in the “haircut” and the political leaders of the Euroelite gained a 
significant access and control over the banking system.
12  Accordingly Article 12 of the statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank 
prohibits direct financing by the ECB to Member States of the EU
13 The Institute of International Finance, Inc. (IIF), is a global association of financial institutions including most of the 
world’s largest commercial and investment banks, as well as insurance companies and investment management 
firms 
14  The margin or difference between the actual market value of a security and the value assessed by the lending side of 
a transaction 
15 Olli Ilmari Rehn (born 31 March 1962) is a Finnish politician, currently serving as European Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs and Vice President of the European Commission
16 The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created by the euro area Member States in 2010 within the 
framework of the Ecofin Council with the mandate to safeguard financial stability in Europe by providing financial 
assistance to euro area Member States. It served as a temporary rescue mechanism and as of 1 July 2013, the EFSF 
does not engage in new financing programmes. The ESM is now the sole and permanent mechanism for responding 
to new requests for financial assistance by euro area Member States  http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm
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c) THE RETROACTIVE COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES (CACs)17
In reality,  this exchange was facilitated because the Greek government compelled Greek 
sovereign bondholders to bear the exchange through the activation of the so-called collective action 
clauses  (“CACs”),  retroactively  applied  to  the  existing  sovereign  bonds.  CACs  provide  that  a 
bondholders’ majority is able to change certain terms of a specific bond arrangement, including 
those concerning maturity, the repayment of the initial principal capital and the specified interest. 
Whereas every country has developed a certain regime providing for bankruptcy cases in the 
private sector and undertakings, unfortunately, there is no common ground concerning sovereign 
debt situations. The insertion of CACs in sovereign bonds was addressed as an expeditious and 
efficient  instrument  to  achieve  debt  restructuring  for  States.  The  implementation  of  CACs  in 
European bonds was introduced in April 2003 by the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC). 
Notable to say that Greece and Italy are the only two Member States of the EU that refused to 
implement CACs in their domestic bond issuance, mainly because this would influence the price 
and liquidity of their bonds, thus it would proliferate the borrowing cost. 
When PSI was already complete, the Greek government decided to amend Greek legislation 
concerning CACs and actually implement what the rest of the Eurozone countries attended by late 
2003.  In order to compel all remaining holders of bonds issued under Greek law to swap their 
securities, the CACs were activated through legislation hastily passed for that purpose in February 
2012,  which  allowed  this  to  have  retroactive  effect18.  The  bonds  issued  under  Greek  law and 
purchased without the terms of CACs changed in an unfair manner. The legislative regime gave the 
right to a qualified majority of bondholders to participate to the restructuring of the Greek debt and 
to modify the contractual claims of the minority without  the latter’s concession,  even  before the 
passing of the statute by the Greek parliament and the enactment of this law.  This ruse led to the 
participation of 95.7% of Greece's creditors in the debt “haircut", which covered €197 billion of the 
total of €206 billion in Greek government bonds. It is manifestly controversial for the CACs to have 
been applied retroactively and  to  change the terms of existing bonds; it should be noted that the 
International Capital Market Association (“ICMA”)19 considered the language used in the Greek 
CACs to be broadly consistent with a new CAC model, that  was recently published by the EFC 
17 A collective action clause (CAC) allows a majority of bondholders to agree to a debt restructuring and this 
agreement becomes legally binding on all holders of the bond, including those who vote against the restructuring
18 Law 4050/2012 introduced by the Greek parliament on 23 February 2012 (thereafter Greek Act)
19 The International Capital Market Association (ICMA) is a unique organisation that affects the global capital market 
and represents a broad range of capital market interests including global investment banks, smaller regional banks 
and more.
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Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets20.
d) THE GREEK CONSTITUTION ON RETROACTIVE FORCE OF LAWS
The Greek Constitution regulates the matter of retroactive force of law dually.  On the one 
hand, certain provisions deal with retroactive laws with specific content and substance,  such as 
Article 7 par.1 regarding the principle of no retroactive force of penal laws21, Article 78 par. 2 on the 
prohibition of laws imposing tax or other economic burden retroactively beyond the financial year 
prior to the year of enforcement of the tax22. In addition, Article 107 par. 2 permits the  one-time 
issuance  of  law,  adjusting  the  terms  of  pause  or  review  of  agreements  concluded  during  the 
dictatorship23. 
On the other hand, Article 77 par. 2 contains a general and significant rule: "A statute which  
is not truly interpretative shall enter into force only as of its publication". By this norm the Greek 
Constitution  brings  forward  a  barrier  to  the  legislative  practice  and  clarifies  that,  when  the 
provisions of a law are new, concerning their substance and content, and are not addressed for the 
interpretation of an already existent regime which was vague or ambiguous, the courts  and the 
administration are not allowed to convey retroactive meaning, even if such a clause is contained. 
The principle of non retroactive force of laws derives from the rule of law principle and 
more specifically from the principle of legal security. The justification is primarily found in the 
admission that, a retroactive law subverts rights or legal conditions that already existed prior to its 
issuance, which led one person to make a certain decision, abide by one attitude and honor specific 
living and financial choices. The legitimate expectations, that any citizen has from the applicable 
laws and the prospect that upon such conditions his choices will be realized, emanate from the need 
of legal certainty and the implementation of rule of law. The essential commodity that is protected,  
thus, is the reliance of citizens in a perspective of non-rollover of already established rights or  
20 This model is mandatory for all sovereign debt securities, for maturities exceeding one (1) year and issued after the 
1st of January 2013, but does not purport to be applied on a retroactive basis
21 Article 7 par. 1 :“There shall be no crime, nor shall punishment be inflicted unless specified by law in force prior to  
the perpetration of the act, defining the constitutive elements of the act. In no case shall punishment more severe  
than that specified at the time of the perpetration of the act be inflicted”
22 Article 78 par. 2: “A tax or any other financial charge may not be imposed by a retroactive statute effective prior to  
the fiscal year preceding the imposition of the tax” 
23 Article 107 par. 2: “A statute, to be promulgated once and for all within three months of the date of entry into force  
of this Constitution, shall specify the terms and the procedure for the revision or cancellation of administrative acts  
approving investments in application of legislative decree 2687/1953 and issued in any form whatsoever, or  
agreements contracted on investment of foreign capital between April 21, 1967 and July 23, 1974, with the  
exception of those pertaining to the registration of ships under the Greek flag”
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prebuilt legal conditions and relationships. 
In  this  legal  framework whenever  a  necessity appears,  such as  new social  changes,  the 
legislator shall intervene to pre-existing legal conditions and relationships  provided that: 
a) Retroactive effect is serving and facilitating the universality and unity of an intented social and 
political transformation,
b) The good of legal certainty, protected by the principle of non retroactive force of laws and the 
good  of  social  equity,  protected  vice-versa,  come  into  collision  whenever  the  retroactive 
intervention results to onerous effects, not when it produces favourable impact for those concerned,
c) Rights and legal relatioships or conditions vested and protected by the Constitution must not be 
upturned.  Article  17  protecting  property  and  ownership  excludes  any  onerous  retrospective 
intervention of the legislator against the holder of that right, save the specifications provided in 
Article 17. 
e) i. NATURAL PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE PSI
The restructure of the Greek debt was certainly not the first, neither the last occurence of 
sovereign debt mitigation through a so called "haircut". The unique features of this project concern 
that: a) it was the largest government debt restructuring in history, concerning almost 78% "haircut" 
of the face value of the Greek bonds, repayment of the initial capital after 30 years and the world’s 
largest liability management transaction ever and 2) it even involved natural persons, who were 
innocent retail investors holding Greek bonds purchased in the primary market, that represented a 
somewhat 5% or 10 billion in the total  debt.   The individuals  in the Greek territory are  about 
15.000,  9.000  of  whom  invested  amounts  up  to  100.000  euros.  These  people  were  namely 
depositors with no prior investment experience, who declare that they were misled by trained bank 
personnel; they were reassured that the transaction entailed priviledged time deposits with higher 
interest rate,  guaranteed by the Greek Public, which is under the permanent monitoring and control 
of the EU, rather than a financial instrument inherent with severe economic risks. 
The Greek Act forcing implementation of CACs in the terms of the pending Greek sovereign 
securities, provided verbatim: 
"The  provisions  of  this  Article  aim  to  protect  the  supreme  (overriding)  public  interest,  are  
mandatory  rules  effective  immediately,  prevail  any  contrary  legislation  of  general  or  special  
provisions”. 
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This reveals the effort of the Greek government to strengthen the regime and erect it in a 
status of “overriding mandatory provisions” closely related to Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation24. 
ii. DIFFERENTIATION OF INVESTOR AND CONSUMER
It  is  essential,  thus,  to  distinguish  between  an  individual  who  decides  to  purchase  an 
investment product, such as sovereign bonds and bears a great level of market risk and investors  
who engage in  such speculations  by profession.  In  the  MiFID II  Impact  Assessment25 the  EU 
introduced the notion of the “mass affluent” in an attempt to evaluate the costs and benefits of the 
present  MiFID investor  protection  reclamation.  There  is  large  diversification  between  Member 
States  regarding  investment  schemes,  household  assets,  the  level  of  investment  expertise  and 
knowledge which renders regulation of investor’s protection, from the consumer's point of view, 
quite difficult. 
The core of this troublesome exercise lies in the distinction between the “prudent saver” and 
the “lusty opportunist” who engages in speculation and asset accumulation. It should be mentioned 
that in the 2008 Optem Report26 for the EU on disclosure, household investors were categorized as 
either “prudent savers who sought “safe” investments and might be seen as similar to consumers,  
or gamblers, ready to bear the market risks”. 
Regarding the sovereign bond market one would emphasize that  the majority of private 
investors are institutional investors supplied with experienced risk analysts and highly paid experts. 
These kinds of investors possess huge resources of capital, are accurately informed on the risks of 
non-payment and engage in the ordinary way in such transactions. It is natural for them to undergo 
the consequences of their decision. But it is debatable if the same should apply to innocent retail  
investors who decide to entrust their savings, or part of it, to financial securities, issued by an EU 
Member State for example; this is the reason why this concerns led to the need for a new regime 
which provided such a distinction between investors. 
In  this  point  two  closely  connected  features  should  be  mentioned,  equally  important 
regarding the assessment of this topic. Greece is an EU Member State and the Greek bonds were, 
according to the European legislation, under the auspice and control of the EU institutions and the 
ECB, and 2) for many years the Greek government provided forged deficit statistics presenting a 
24 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable 
to contractual obligations (Rome I)
25 Directive 2008/10/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008
26 Pre-contractual information for financial services Qualitative study in the 27 member states Summary Report
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lower debt than the actual one and thus had misinformed the public on the actual risks involved in  
the  Greek  sovereign  bonds  market.  These  two  factors  indicate  that,  apart  from  the  Greek 
governments who participated in this fraud and should, obviously,  be held accountable for that, 
nevertheless, the EU also bears responsibility for its failure to monitor and prevent this situation, as  
it should according to Article 121TFEU paragraph 427 and Article 126TFEU, especially paragraph 
11  which  holds  that:  “As  long  as  a  Member  State  fails  to  comply  with  a  decision  taken  in  
accordance with paragraph 9, the Council may decide to apply or, as the case may be, intensify one  
or more of the following measures: — to require the Member State concerned to publish additional  
information, to be specified by the Council, before issuing bonds and securities”. The reluctance of 
the European political leaders to undergo control of their national financies by the institutions of the 
EU, has resulted in losses for thousands of individuals who did not have “a say” in this policy. 
6. SPECIFIC ISSUES ABOUT THE PSI
Certain important factors concerning the PSI contrivance should be underlined. The first one 
is about the inequality of treatment, as the restructuring process included only the private sector, 
while public debt was excluded. All Greek bonds held by the European financial institutions along 
with the ones owned by the NCBs fall in this category. One could argue, though, that the public  
sector acquired these bonds in order to provide liquidity to Greece as part of the Securities Market 
Program (SMP) during the conduct of ECB's monetary policy. Nevertheless, the truth is that, just 
before the exchange, the EU governments bailed out,  not only the ECB in terms of the SMP, but 
also all NCBs who had bought Greek bonds for investment and not for monetary purposes.
Secondly, European leaders decided that the “voluntary” path for the PSI would be the best 
one.  In  other  words,  they  assessed  that  they  had  enough  political  power  so  as  to  push  the 
bondholders to accept the losses. As soon as they realized that this was not the case, they referred to 
the old standard “L'État, c'est moi” (I am the state)28. The original Greek bonds did not include 
CACs  and  Greece  decided  to  retrospectively  introduce them  after  the  commencement  of  the 
restructuring. The so-called retroactive CACs were nothing more  than  a deception. Greece  under 
27  Article 121 par. 4: “Where it is established, under the procedure referred to in paragraph 3, that the economic  
policies of a Member State are not consistent with the broad guidelines referred to in paragraph 2 or that they risk  
jeopardising the proper functioning of economic and monetary union, the Commission may address a warning to the  
Member State concerned. The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, may address the necessary  
recommendations to the Member State concerned. The Council may, on a proposal from the Commission, decide to  
make its recommendations public”
28 This quote attributed, by some, to Louis XIV, King of France, as addressed to the Parliament of Paris (April 13, 
1655) remains disputed.
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the blessings of the EU exercised its sovereign power not to pay its creditors and passed the Law 
4050/2012,  under  which  contract  law  was  left  out  and  “Public  Interest”  with  “mandatory 
provisions” became the core of the whole scheme. Article 9 of EU 593/2008 was engaged,  thus 
implementing European legislation. 
For that subversion to bear a minimum of legitimization and striving to displace the blame 
into the banks, the heads of EU suggested a vote of the bondholders, which took place and is highly 
critised  by  analysts  and  commentators.  On  one  hand  the  Greek  institutional  bondholders  who 
represented the 35% of the eligible bonds were either bribed (through recapitalization for the banks) 
or constrained (fiduciaries of the pension funds revealed that they were menaced). European banks 
were also offered a preferential status once they agreed to take part in the restructure. On the other 
hand, the IIF representatives were besieged by their respective governments. Non-banks, pension 
funds, insurances, non-European investors, innocent retail investors lost 78% of their money on the 
spot, due to this unilateral conversion of the bonds' agreement. 
It should be borne in mind that the Greek debt restructuring was a perception conceived by 
politicians, merely by the Euroelite who made false promises to their electors that banks would pay 
for the bad decisions they took when undertaking risky investments and who concealed the fact that 
recapitalizations of banks would actually take place with taxpayers' money.  And when European 
leaders declared that the restructuring would occur on a voluntary basis, they were obviously lying. 
Mario Draghi29 questioning the rationale of private sector involvement, stated “the PSI was, I would  
say, an understandable political response to the indignation of the people of Europe in the face of  
selfish behaviour by some governments, when making their fiscal policy and their budgetary policy.  
But this had several, serious unintended consequences, and we are living through them now" while 
Roger  McCormick30 correctly  emphasized  “The  eurozone  needs  stability  and  the  EU needs  to  
restore investor confidence, and this agreement should provide more time”.
7. EXPROPRIATION OF BONDHOLDERS
A critical  assessment  needs  to  be  made  regarding  whether  the  “overriding  mandatory 
provisions”  as  referred  in  the  Greek  Act,  which  retro-effectively  activated  the  CACs  and  the 
exchange of bond debt in such a fashion, qualifies as a “forced expropriation”. The argument of the 
29 Mario Draghi (born 3 September 1947) is an Italian economist and banker, serving as President of the European 
Central Bank
30 Roger McCormick is the Director of the Sustainable Finance Project at London School of Economics and Political 
Science, and a Visiting Professor at LSE
23
Dissertation 2013 Ioannidou Stavroula
voluntary  character  of  the  “haircut”,  as  decided  by  the  abovementioned  qualified  majority  of 
bondholders,  could  not  be  legally  sufficient,  because  the  consent  that  was  necessary  for  the 
activation of CACs was provided long before the enactment of the respective law. Furthermore, this 
law does not regulate in a general manner and for indefinite cases, on the contrary the Greek State is 
the sole part which benefits from the provisions of the regime on this specific situation, which, after 
all, was the only objective of the statute. It is generally accepted that when States choose to engage 
with investors on a contractual basis, they waive their sovereign power for that purpose and accept 
the application of general principles of private law for any dispute arising from these contractual 
claims. Latter rulemaking that allows avoidance of contractual obligations of the State based on its 
sovereign power is unacceptable from the perspective of justice. 
a) BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (BITs) 
Bilateral  Investment  Treaties  are  treaties  agreed  between  two  states  under  which  they 
mutually agree to protect private foreign investments from expropriation, setting strict conditions on 
that  matter  and  providing  adequate  compensation,  in  case  it  occurs.  BITs  form  the  basis  of 
individual  contractual  claims  and  recoupment  and  regulate  non-discrimination  of  the  foreign 
investor, fair and equitable treatment compared to nationals or other third parties (a third state or its 
nationals). The investment qualified to be protected under a BIT is usually a direct investment, in 
the  host  state's  territory,  which  includes  the  acquisition  of  assets  held  in  that  country  or  the 
acquisition of shares. Whether sovereign bonds can be assessed as direct investment, safeguarded 
by BITs, or not, is unclear.
b) ABACLAT AND OTHERS V. ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
In Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic31 the same query was addressed.  The Arbitral 
Tribunal  at  the  International  Centre  for  Settlement  of  Investment  Disputes  (ICSID)  decided on 
claims  of  over  180,000  individuals  and  corporations  against  Argentina  that  originated from 
sovereign bonds.  A BIT signed between Argentina and Italy in 1990 set the basis. In December 
2001 Argentina declared default on its sovereign bonds and later on invited investors on exchange 
offers. In 2005 the “Emergency” Law was enacted, which put an end to the exchange procedure and 
31 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (formerly Giovanna a Beccara and Others v. 
The Argentine Republic) 
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no bonds could be exchanged furthermore.
c) SOVEREIGN POWERS
One significant point in Abaclat, closely related to the Greek case, was about the contractual 
nature of the investors’ claims against Argentina. The tribunal  founded that “… with respect to a  
BIT claim an arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction where the claim at stake is a pure contract claim 
… because a BIT is not meant to correct or replace contractual remedies ….” and continued that 
“… where the equilibrium of the contract and the provisions contained therein” were “unilaterally 
altered by a sovereign act of the Host State” the claim cannot be perceived as a pure contract claim. 
An  exception  is  applied,  according  to  the  forum,  whenever “… the  circumstances  and/or  the  
behavior of the Host State appear to derive from its exercise of sovereign State power. Whilst the  
exercise of such power may have an impact on the contract and its equilibrium, its origin and  
nature are totally foreign to the contract.”
Such circumstances were found in the Argentine Emergency Law of 2005. As for Greece, 
the  enactment  of  the  retrospective  CACs  through  the  Greek  Act  satisfies  those  exceptional 
requirements  well.  With  the introduction  of  this  law,  Greece gained advantages  founded on its 
sovereign powers, albeit the unilateral alteration of the contract terms had no legal basis.
d) THE NOTION OF INVESTMENT
The meaning of investment was also dealt by the tribunal in the Argentine case, a fact with 
equal  importance  for  Greek bond investors.  In  order  for  the  BIT to  be  relevant  to  the  claims 
deriving by the bonds,  these claims should qualify as investment  claims  according to the BIT. 
Following a wide approach, the tribunal proceeded in the interpretation of the wording in the BIT,  
where in  Art. 1  it is held  that “investment shall mean, in compliance with the legislation of the  
receiving State and independent of the legal form adopted or of any other legislation of reference,  
any conferment or asset invested or reinvested by an individual or corporation of one Contracting  
Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party, in compliance with the laws and regulations of  
the latter party”.  In addition, Article 1 provides an enumeration of investment examples, such as 
“bonds, private  or public financial instruments or any other right to performances or services  
having economic value, including capitalized revenues”. The rationale of the tribunal was founded 
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first on “… rights and values which may be endangered by measures of the Host State, such as an  
expropriation, and therefore deserve protection”.  Matching the objective of the BIT to secure the 
protection of investors and in light of the wording of Art. 1, the panel decided that  the Argentine 
sovereign bonds qualified as an investment protected under the relevant BIT.
Another aspect of the matter was whether  bond purchases  formed  an investment “in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party” as usually required in BITs. Argentina argued that this was 
not the case with its sovereign bondholders, because the investment concerned investors and banks 
as intermediaries, thus no money was ever transferred from investors to  Argentina. This objection 
was  not  accepted  by  the  tribunal  as  it  referred  to  the  financial  nature  of  investment  criteria, 
specifying as substantial “… where and/or for the benefit of whom the funds are ultimately used,  
and not the place where the funds were paid out or transferred.” 
The above mentioned conclusions of the tribunal constitute a significant weapon supporting 
that similarly the Greek sovereign bonds qualify as investment, under the BITs that Greece has 
signed with other states, the nationals of which might be holders of Greek sovereign debt through 
bonds and who were forced to accept a “haircut” on their initial capital and the revenues and an 
elongation of the maturity. For this category of investors, as discussed below, there is a possibility 
to appeal to the ICSID under the related provisions.
e) GREEK BONDHOLDERS
The opportunity, though, to resort to ICSID arbitration under the relevant BITs applies only 
to the nationals of other countries, not to Greek bondholders, provided that Article 25 of the ICSID 
Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings on Jurisdiction of the Centre recognizes jurisdiction 
only for disputes arising between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State32. 
32 Article 25: (1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment,  
between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the  
Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing  
to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.
(2) "National of another Contracting State" means:
(a) any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute on the  
date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration as well as on the date on  
which the request was registered pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article 28 or paragraph (3) of Article 36, but does  
not include any person who on either date also had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute; and
(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute on the  
date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any juridical person  
which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign  
control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of this  
Convention.
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Under these findings, Greek bondholders are not entitled to exercise this tool and are left 
with the only option to resort to Greek courts. Indeed, a great number of natural persons, individuals 
who had trusted the Greek state with their  money, appealed to Greek justice,  claiming that the 
“haircut” led to a dramatic impairment of their property and was imposed on them without having 
participated in any negotiation. 
The unconstitutionality of the "haircut" lies firstly on the retroactive effect stemming from 
the implementing  PSI  law and secondly on the fact that  the property protection provisions of the 
Greek Constitution  could form the legal basis for challenging the dramatic  reduction  of the face 
value  of  the  bonds.  The Greek Constitution,  as  amended in 2008,  visualizes  an  effort  to  keep 
balance  between the  need for  respect  and protection  of private  property rights  with  the  state's 
commitment  to  secure  the  public  interest  on  economic  level.  According  to  the  constitutional 
provisions, private property rights cannot be invoked contrary to the public interest (Art 17.1)33 and 
following  that private economic activities  should not grow to the disadvantage of human dignity 
and freedom, or in a way that the national economy is damaged (Art 106.2)34, it continues clarifying 
that a state should not intervene with private property, even if the protection of public interest is the 
ultimate goal, unless a full compensation is paid (Art 17.2)35.
Notable to say the Greek Constitution  secures the protection of  property rights in a broad 
sense,  as  these  rights  derive  from contractual  and  real  property  transactions.  This  approach  is 
consequent to the Protocol 1, Article 1 of the  European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
which safeguards all property rights and interests36. 
 The State Council in vast majority concluded that the controversial PSI procedure lies within 
the limits of the Greek Constitution, a decision that was highly criticized in the legal community.  
The full  operative part  is  unavailable  as  the  decision is,  so far,  not  officially published,  but  it  
became apparent that the Court classified the involvement of small Greek debt bondholders in the 
bond  swap  as  constitutionally  accepted,  on  public  interest  grounds,  which  were  invoked 
indefinitely.  Furthermore, the State Council judges ruled that the procedure took place in a fair 
manner and under objective criteria, without infringement of the Constitution, such as Article 4 
33 Article 17 par.1: “Property is under the protection of the State; rights deriving therefrom, however, may not be  
exercised contrary to the public interest”
34 Article 106 par.2: “Private economic initiative shall not be permitted to develop at the expense of freedom and  
human dignity, or to the detriment of the national economy”
35 Article 17 par.2: “No one shall be deprived of his property except for public benefit which must be duly proven,  
when and as specified by statute and always following full compensation corresponding to the value of the  
expropriated property at the time of the court hearing on the provisional determination of compensation. In cases in  
which a request for the final determination of compensation is made, the value at the time of the court hearing of the  
request shall be considered”
36 As it will be introduced subsequently
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concerning equality of citizens. From the beginning it was considered as a risky venture to request 
Greek judges to decide in favour of the individual debt bondholders and against the Greek State,  
while the worst financial crisis is plaguing the country.
f) THE EUROPEAN LAW ON EXPROPRIATION
It is very likely that investors who suffered a “haircut” in their bonds during the operation of 
the Greek debt restructuring consider the reduction of their property as an expropriation  and all 
relative  legal  provision  protecting  property  rights  will  be  useful.  Article 17  of  the  Charter  of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU (2000/C 364/01), holds on the Right to Property that:
"Everyone  has  the  right  to  own,  use,  dispose  of  and  bequeath  his  or  her  lawfully  acquired  
possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in  
the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in  
good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for  
the general interest."
This article is  based on  Article 1 of the Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) :
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall  
be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided  
for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not,  
however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it  deems necessary to  
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes  
or other contributions or penalties.”
It is helpful to examine what has been defined as property up until now in order to define 
expropriation.  The rights referred in article 1 are fundamental and common to every EU Member 
State's constitution.  The general rules applicable when  we examine whether or not a violation of 
Article 1  has occurred,  were set out in  James v United Kingdom37.  One issue addressed regarded 
whether the deprivation was justified on ‘public interest’ grounds. States enjoy considerable power 
when applying that feature. The court held that the national authorities' decision shall be respected, 
save the case it is proven ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation’. One should keep in mind that 
courts are generally unwilling to challenge the state’s argument on what actually constitutes public 
interest,  thus it is inevitable that  not many successful challenges to measure on this ground  have 
37 James and others v The United Kingdom - 8793/79 [1986] ECHR 2 (February 21, 1986)
28
Dissertation 2013 Ioannidou Stavroula
been recorded. 
Furthermore,  the court  considered if  there is  a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between  the  means  employed  and  the  objective  pursued,  holding that  there  should  be  a ‘fair’ 
balance between safeguarding the general interests of the society and the need to secure and protect 
the individual’s fundamental rights. Such a balance is by no means fair when the applicant is subject 
to ‘an  individual  and  excessive  burden’.  The  seizing  of  one's property  without  a  reasonable 
compensation for the loss, is apparently a disproportionate intervention and a breach of Article 1 is 
established.
 In Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece38 the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) adjudicated in favour of the applicants in their compensation claim for a violation 
of Article 1,  Protocol 1 of the ECHR. The right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions was 
infringed, according to the Court, because the State interfered with an arbitral award and therefore 
interfered with the applicants' property right.
It was not argued that the Greek Republic, when exercising its sovereign power, did not have 
the  discretion  to  terminate  a  contract,  arranged  during  the  dictatorship  of  1967-1974,  as  it 
considered to be of the best interest of the country, but the ECtHR pointed out that a compensation 
should have been provided. Under these findings, a recognition of the superior state interest taking 
precedence over individuals' contractual claims was reflected, always taking into account the need 
to secure a fair balance in the underlying contractual relationship. 
8. BANK DEPOSITS CONFISCATION
a) THE CASE OF CYPRUS
 Soon after the Greek PSI, Cyprus found itself in a difficult bail-out situation. It should be 
pointed out that the Greek PSI took place with no forecast for recapitalization of the Cypriot banks, 
which were heavily exposed to Greek debt bonds and the "haircut" generated extra losses for banks 
in Cyprus. The Cypriot government, at the time, did not realize the noose they were agreeing to 
bear. On March 2013, the finance ministers of the Eurozone, in response to the need of Cyprus' bail-
out, introduced a levy on bank deposits held in the Cypriot banks, applying both to national and 
foreign  depositors.  This  decision,  certainly,  came  across  fierce  oppositions  from  academics, 
38 Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece 13427/87 [1994] ECHR 48 (December 9, 1994) 
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economists, politicians inside and outside the EU, media, experts and apparently Cypriot citizens. 
Cyprus needed a €17 billion bailout for matured government debt, government deficits and 
for financial system support. The IMF, the ECB and the European Commission (EC), or so called 
Troika39, offered  €10 billion, a relatively big amount compared to the size of Cyprus' economy40. 
The reasoning why the island’s needs and the Troika’s amount are so different is twofolded. First, 
Cyprus  needed  €7 billion for the recapitalization of the banking sector,  an amount  that  neither 
Germany nor the other Eurogroup countries were willing to pay. The basic argument was that such 
saving of the banking sector would secure wealthy non-EU depositors in Cypriot banks from the 
collapse of their banks, which appeared to be a moral issue.
On the other hand, the IMF assessed that participation in the programme would result to an 
unsustainable debt for Cyprus, havind the Greek precedent in mind. The  Cypriot  banking sector 
surpassed the country’s GDP, principally consisting in depositors of €66.7 billion, reflecting 71% of 
the liabilities. 40% were Cypriot residents, 34% non-residents domiciled in Cyprus, 19% Greeks 
and 7% from the rest of the world. The depositors bail-in plan seemed ideal to the IMF as the 
Cypriot banking system had this special features. The Eurogroup, therefore, asked Cyprus to raise 
on its own the €7 billion needed for the banking rescue and though the Cyprus government made 
several suggestions that excluded  the  participation of depositors, it  became clear to the Cypriot 
deputation that only considerations affecting depositors, were to be assessed. The outcome was that 
all  depositors  in  all  Cypriot  financial  institutions  were  stricken.  For  deposits  over  the  insured 
€100,000 there would be a 9.9% diversion of their deposits into shares of the troubled banks, which 
would actually assume their deposits for the sake of their recapitalization. Surprisingly, 6.75% of 
insured depositors were also affected. 
In April 2013 Nicos Anastasiades, the Prime Minister of Cyprus, asserted «Regrettably, this  
fundamental EU principle was not respected. On the contrary, decisions reached beforehand by the  
interested parties were coercively imposed». He added, «I sincerely hope that this precedent in  
relation to Cyprus is not going to be applied elsewhere in Europe, although, as it is well known, the  
main  raison d’etre  of  a  precedent  is  that  it  can  serve  the  purpose  of  establishing  norms  and  
guidelines to be repeatedly and universally applied». 
The legislative contrivance in Cyprus' case was that the European leadership refrained from 
legislating on bank deposits confiscation, at that time, on EU level, where Cyprus would implement 
39 “Troika” is referred to the enhanced cooperation between the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB in staff-
level program discussions with governments, on the policies that are needed to put their economies back on the path 
of sustainable economic growth
40 56 per cent of 2012 GDP
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the provisions of such a regime as an EU Member State. On the contrary  the heads of Europe 
brilliantly rolled over the responsibility to legislate on the levy to the Cyprus government which 
was clearly extorted to pass with a thin majority such a regime through its Parliament in order to get 
the rescue package. In Eurogroup negotiations, the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble 
had warned Cyprus that "unless there was a bail-in, there would be no bailout"41. 
b) THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY UNDER THE CYPRIOT LEGISLATION
The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, compatible with all European regimes regarding 
the right to property, protects this concession in Article 23. As examined in a previous chapter, on 
the Greek "haircut", the right to property is enshrined in Article 1 Protocol 1 of the ECHR as the 
right to peaceful enjoyment of possession and thereafter Article 17 par. 1 of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (as stated above). Article 52 par. 3 of the Charter provides that the scope of this 
right is the same as the one protected by the ECHR.  
When passing the relevant statute Cyprus was actually carrying the burden to transpose the 
Eurogroup Decision into its legal order. Save the fact that such a Decision has no binding effects, 
Cyprus  bears  all  liability  and  prospective  for  sanctions  for  any  infringement  of  its  own 
Constitution's provisions safeguarding the right to property when it enforced the levy on its ‘own’ 
initiative. But if the Economic and Financial Affairs Council42 (ECOFIN) had reached a decision 
before  the  Cypriot  legislation,  the  national  legislation  would  certainly fall  within  the  scope of 
Article  51  of  the  Charter  and  the  outcome would  be  entirely different.  Regarding  the  field  of 
application of rights protected under the Charter, it is most useful to visit the  ECJ’s very recent 
Judgment of 26/2/2013 in C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson43.
41 A. Breidthardt and J. O’Donnell, ‘Insight—How Europe stumbled into scheme to punish Cyprus savers’ Reuters (18 
March 2013)
  http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/18/us-eurozone-cyprus-stumbled-insight-idUSBRE92H0RH20130318 
42  It is commonly known as the Ecofin Council, or simply "Ecofin" and is composed of the Economics and Finance 
Ministers of the Member States, as well as Budget Ministers when budgetary issues are discussed. 
43 "20 That definition of the field of application of the fundamental rights of the European Union is borne out by the  
explanations relating to Article 51 of the Charter, which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) 
TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, have to be taken into consideration for the purpose of interpreting it (see, to  
this  effect,  Case  C-279/09  DEB  [2010]  ECR  1-13849,  paragraph  32).  According  to  those  explanations,  ‘the 
requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the context of the Union is only binding on the Member States 
when they act in the scope of Union law’.
    21  Since  the  fundamental  rights  guaranteed  by  the  Charter  must  therefore  be  complied  with  where  national  
legislation falls within the scope of European Union law, situations cannot exist which are covered in that way by 
European Union law without those fundamental rights being applicable. The applicability of European Union law 
entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.”
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9. THE SOLIDARITY LEVY 
The President of the Eurogroup of Eurozone Finance Ministers, Jeroen Dijsselbloem stated 
on March 16, 2013, that: "As it is a  contribution to the financial stability of Cyprus, it seems "just"  
to ask a contribution of all deposit holders”. On the 18th of the same month, he stated among others 
the following, on behalf of the Eurogroup: “The Eurogroup continues to be of the view that small  
depositors should be treated differently from large depositors and reaffirms the importance of fully  
guaranteeing deposits below €100,000. The Cypriot authorities will introduce more progressivity in  
the  one-off  levy…provided  that  it  continues  yielding  the  targeted  reduction of  the  financing 
envelope and, hence, not impact the overall amount of financial assistance up to € 10 billion.”
Mr. Dijsselbloem on behalf of the Eurogroup Ministers actually announced that it was “just” 
for “all” depositors to participate in the Solidarity Levy. This illustrates that the Euroleadership had 
no consideration for the small depositors, who up until then felt secured by the deposit insurance 
scheme, on cases of banks'  financial  difficulties.  German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble 
announced in  the  German daily paper "Bild" that "Cyprus is and will remain a special one-off  
case," and "Savings accounts in Europe are safe". It is very curious now that he, who persisted on 
the Big Hit on depositors mostly, passed responsibility to the Commission, the ECB and the Cypriot 
government  for  the  disastrous  result,  when he stated:  ”We would obviously  have respected the  
deposit guarantee for accounts up to €100,000,”...“But those who did not want a bail-in were the  
Cypriot government, also the European Commission and the ECB, they decided on this solution  
and they now must explain this to the Cypriot people.”
European officials tried their best to stress that Cyprus' bailout was a unique case - after 
Eurogroup chairman's, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, suggestion that this scheme would provide a model for 
similar crises in the future. "Together in the Eurogroup we decided to have the owners and creditors  
take  part  in  the  costs  of  the  rescue  -  in  other  words  those  who helped  cause  the  crisis ,"  Mr. 
Schaeuble stated.
10. EUROPE IS PRACTICING FOR THE "HAIRCUT" COMMUNITY
The EU veritably left all others behind in introducing the deposits' confiscation. On April 24, 
2013 the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON) of the European Parliament (EP) 
voted on a proposal for a Directive on bank recovery and resolution. As a basic feature of the 
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reformed EU banking legislation, there was a debate in the ECOFIN on deposit cuts conducted in 
May, and on the 20th of the same month a group of lawmakers in the EP’s Economics Committee  
overwhelmingly held that, from 2016, within the EU, large depositors could suffer losses, provided 
that the respective bank, where the account is held, needs a rescue, exactly as the scenario in Cyprus 
took  place.  With  this  decision  depositors  of  more  than  €100.000  are  renamed  as  “investors”, 
although they do not participate in bank profits as bondholders or shareholders do. The EP along 
with the countries of the EU stipulate the regime, under which regulators could impose damages on 
creditors and proceed with other measures as well, during a bank bailout, suggesting the formation 
of national resolution funds backed up on bank contributions. The fundamental provisions are:
1. Deposits under  €100,000 would be safeguarded.
2. A bank  that has exhausted other avenues such as shareholders and bondholders, shall "obtain 
access" into accounts with more than  €100,000.
3. The new bank bail out system will become effective in 2016.
4. A national resolution fund based on bank contributions system is introduced. Certain experts 
promote a Europe-wide resolution fund and the European Commission will address such a proposal, 
but Germany seems to resist.
5. A separation in reliable and risky bank depositors is addressed. The terms of the foreclosings are 
based on the category of the depositor.
There is also the small print of the agreement. According to EU sources, there is a window: 
Not even depositors with amounts lower than  €100,000 are considered secured. The justification of 
the whole project derives from the reluctance of the European leaders to impose additional weights 
on taxpayers, when a need to rescue banks occurs, when the other possible bail-in options (stocks, 
bonds, unsecured deposits over €100,000) are not sufficient, thus the small depositors will be called 
in to "bail-in". 
11.  a)THE STATUS QUO OF THE EUROZONE
After examining the Greek debt restructuring, the bank depositors "haircut" in Cyprus and 
the confiscation regime that is  about  to apply in the EU, two conclusions can be  drawn. The EU 
lead who was responsible for these operations showed no political sense and consideration and such 
policies lack any sense of justice or moral compassion, towards the countries that needed assistance. 
The burden was, to a considerate extent, rolled over to innocent citizens, for the most part not the 
33
Dissertation 2013 Ioannidou Stavroula
wealthy ones,  although  extensive  attempts have  been  made,  to  illustrate  that  all  Greek  debt 
bondholders  were investors of great wealth and all,  or most of, the depositors  in Cyprus  were 
Russian oligarchists who had transferred laundered money to the Cypriot banks. One could  point 
out that the videos of people protesting outside the Greek Parliament and the State Council, as well 
as the Cypriots banging on bank doors, who were denied access to their bank accounts, do not prove 
anything else, but human suffering. The only concern of the politicians in Eurozone is whether the 
payable amount “yields the targeted reduction of the financing envelope”. Europe was by no means 
founded on such pillars and will certainly not accord on this formula for a long time.
The term “Solidarity Levy” is a typical example of the cynicism featuring the EU’s current 
political leadership. The term ‘solidarity’ was contemplated earlier when this thesis assessed the 
fundamental principals and values of the EU, but at the time it was introduced in the EU, it had a 
completely different meaning.  In general, the principles of justice, equality and non-discrimination 
seem to have lost ground with the new generation of politicians, who are facing a severe financial 
turmoil, on the one hand, but are still flaunting dangerous tactics and harsh measures on people. 
Some of the main objectives of the Treaty on EU refer to “justice” and “solidarity” 44 but the 
provisions sound to millions of citizens of the Eurozone like long forgotten benedictions. According 
to the Treaty Article 5 TEU and the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, the European Union must act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by 
the Treaties and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
Confiscating savings in bank accounts and denying people access to their property without 
warning introduces a new era for the EU and the whole world in the future and will certainly cause 
immense harm to citizens' willingness and trust to save, invest and build wealth. Subsequently, this 
strict  accounting  culture  which  is  applied,  will  hit  not  only savings  and investment  but  future 
economic growth all over Europe.
One final aspect of this part concerns the rule of law. When one refers to a society governed 
by the "rule of law", not only he entails the laws, the regimes governing enforcement of provisions 
or  terms  of  contracts,  security  instruments  and the  like,  but  primarily  he  indicates  the  society 
whereby such laws are expected to be dignified and all parties are accountable for the obligations 
44 Article 2: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule  
of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are  
common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail”.
 Article 3: “The Union shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and 
protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the  
child. It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States”.
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they assume. Every deposit and every sovereign bond represents an agreement concluded by certain 
parties  (individuals,  legal entities,  a State or an association of States)  which is  supposed to  be 
performed on a voluntary basis. If a dispute arises, it is reasonable and legitimate that a mechanism 
for an impartial and quick resolution exists. As far as banks are concerned, a depositor entrusts his 
property, his money, to the bank with a legitimate expectation to be paid back by the bank as he was 
promised in the respective banking agreement. Likewise, a bondholder, who confides his property 
to a state or an entity, abides that the claims deriving from the relative contract shall be respected  
and gratified, exactly as stipulated in the contract. The precedents addressed in this thesis, are put to 
the test in relation with the principals of justice, rule of law, social justice and protection, solidarity 
and non-discrimination.
Benjamin Friedman in his book "The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth" provides a 
significant opinion that in times when civil  and political  rights supercede,  it  is  when economic 
growth springs.
b) REALITY IN THE EU AS MEASURED
While 2012 brought a Nobel Peace Prize for the EU for its role in "the advancement of 
peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe", reality in the Eurozone appears 
quite different.  Severe social, political, economic and constitutional impairments occured during 
the crisis,  which compromised and imperiled fundamental  rights,  which up till  now were fully 
respected.
The impact of the financial turmoil is illustrated a) in the unemployment rate, which in the 
EU affected  about  26  million  people  (December  2012  –  Eurostat45 data),  b)  in  labour  market 
conditions,  which  were  highly  damaged,  trampling  all  progress  attained  in  recent  years 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development "OECD"46 figures) and c) in the rate of 
almost 24,2% of EU population that came at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2011, which 
amounts to 116 million citizens. In addition, lower income led to poorer health results, as provided 
by the European Commission, whereby one third of EU citizens stated that by December 2011 they 
had great difficulties to cover their medical expenses and healthcare in general.
45 Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Union situated in Luxembourg. Its task is to provide the European 
Union with statistics at European level that enable comparisons between countries and regions 
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/about_eurostat/introduction 
46 The mission of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is to promote policies that 
will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world http://www.oecd.org/about/ 
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Furthermore  some  EU  states  are  experiencing  social  unrest,  protests,  anti-migrant 
movements  by  political  entities,  decreasing  trust  in  governments,  extremist  ideologies  and 
xenophobic spirit. In times of austerity and long-term unemployment, social rights become more 
important and the commitment  to safeguard these rights is  contested.  Notable to  say,  the  crisis 
affected  in  great  extent  the  way EU  residents  view  one  another,  impoverishing  solidarity.  As 
illustrated in Pew Global Attitudes Survey47, only 27%- 48% of respondents in the Chech Republic, 
Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom see Greece favourably as a State, 
whereas several proposals have been made in many EU States that Greece should be expelled by the 
euro currency and the EU48.
12. CONCLUSIVE THOUGHTS AND PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
It was, certainly, a severe fault of the heads of the EU, past and present, to assume that 
economic integration would lead to political integration effortlessly. Another mistake was to force 
the pace of integration,  mostly with the EMU and, now to use the financial  crisis as a way to 
achieve  the  political  unification  in  the  EU,  through  coordination  in  fiscal  and  social  policies. 
Nevertheless, it is clear, now more than ever, that "the EMU rests upon a relatively strong "M" and 
a weak "E"49.
The adoption of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU ("Fiscal 
Compact") by the Heads of State or Government of Member States in the Eurozone could be a 
suitable  measure  to  introduce  a  new  fiscal  arrangement  and  coordinate  a  stronger  economic 
environment. In addition, the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a 
permanent mechanism, takes over the tasks,  which up until now the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) were fulfilling and 
provides financial assistance to Eurozone Member States who are being threatened by significant 
financing  problems.  Thus  ESM  is  considered,  from  this  point  of  view,  indispensable  for 
safeguarding financial stability in the Eurozone area.
47 Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping 
America and the world. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis and other 
empirical social science research. Pew Research does not take policy positions. It is a subsidiary of The Pew 
Charitable Trusts http://www.pewresearch.org/about/
48 "2012 has been another very bad year for Europe. After five years of economic crisis, recession has returned,  
unemployment has reached levels not experienced in nearly two decades and the social situation is also  
deteriorating" European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2012), 
"Employment and social developments in Europe" 2012, Brussels.
49 "Τhe evolution of the European Central Bank" by Rosa Μ. Lastra, pg. 1272, HeinOnLine
Citation: 35 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1260 2011-2012
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It should be noted that, though the present financial crisis has deep roots, nevertheless it 
should not lead to a spirit of total catastrophism. It is essential for the EU to adopt contingency 
plans for internal or external cases of financial  shocks. Furthermore, it  should be clear that the 
respective Member States are responsible for their own debts and a specific control mechanism 
should be established in order to assess the balance sheet, not only of the countries dealing with  
financing problems, but of each of the EU members. This process could include adequate central 
sanctions  of  governments  with  excessive  expenditures  long  before  the  situation  becomes 
irreversible. 
As we now live in a "two-speed Europe", the wealthy North and the poor South, there have 
been  several  proposals  to  support  economies  of  the  South  by  helping  them  attract  important 
investments and establish efficient arrangements for monitoring tax collection. It is common place 
that  the  countries  of  the  North  have  developed  remarkable  administrative  policies  and  good 
governance, valuable instruments that play a significant role in their economy. The transmission of 
the "know how" to the weaker Southern countries would provide a long-term assistance, while the 
funding of one country's  deficit  solves the problem only temporarily.  The fiscal strategy of the 
Union has to set high priorities: research and development, innovation and education. These should 
be the basic actions for the future, for increasing competitiveness and economic growth50. 
A key aspect of the present situation in the EU is the fragile character of the supranational 
institutions, which, compared to their national similar, lack independence and social acceptance. 
While  the  European  treaties  acknowledge  each  institution’s  competencies  and  declare  them 
independent of any political interference, the reality is not so. The bodies operating in the EU are 
quite dependent on the European political leadership, especially the so called Euroelite of the North 
and the absence of a  European government,  including a  supranational  Ministry of  Finances,  is 
noticeable. Provided that such a democratic government of the Union could not be formed under the 
European treaties, we are facing repeated efforts of certain countries to lead the way for the others 
and impose their policies and decisions. 
In certain occasions, there have been suggestions to confront the EU's democratic shortage 
through the operation and the transfer of more competencies to the EP. It is very disappointing that 
the  strengthening of  its  role  coincides  with a  steady decline  of  the  voters'  participation  in  the 
European elections and the shriveling of the European project by the majority of the population. 
One important aspect of this acknowledgment is the excess of the competencies provided in the 
50 See also in the Appendix, the Opening address by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, to the 
Brussels Economic Forum 2010 "Lessons from a crisis"
37
Dissertation 2013 Ioannidou Stavroula
European institutions by the legislative regimes. The European integration objective obtained an 
elitist temper51 and Germany engaged in imposing a conservative recipe of austerity to the Member 
States facing trouble with the financial turmoil, claiming that the survival of Europe is identical to 
the survival of the euro-currency52. 
Under  these  considerations  the  Group  of  the  Progressive  Alliance  of  Socialists  and 
Democrats  in  the  EP assigned  the  conduction  of  a  survey  about  the  European  democracy  to 
DEMOS53.  Assessment  of  specific  elements  of  the  problem and proposals  to  avoid  democratic 
backsliding  in  the  EU  are  included  in  a  250  pages  report  called  "Backsliders"  and  subtitle 
"Democracy in Europe can no longer be taken for granted". The democratic challenge is the core of 
the initiatives that should be taken. The EU is founded on the attempt to surpass the divergences 
between the Member States and the objective to enjoy a common future where democracy shall be 
promoted,  the  rule  of  law  shall  prevail  and  citizens'  rights  shall  be  protected.  The  European 
Commission must realize its duty as the upholder of democracy and the promoter of pluralism and 
good governance throughout Europe. 
Democratic  considerations  should  mainly  focus  on  the  participation  of  citizens  in  the 
European elections and their contribution to decision making. It should be clarified that people in 
the EU have the right to be active, to feel equal and to express their opinions and objections through 
an  innovative  parliamentary  procedure.  The  EP  should  closely  cooperate  with  the  National 
Parliaments in their  legislative mandate and political debates should be accepted and respected. 
Citizenship should be a material right enjoyed by all Member States' people in the same manner, not 
a theory for academic purposes.
Furthermore, equally important to the protection and promotion of European democracy is 
the  accomplishment  of  the  EU population's  expectations,  as  laid  down in  the  Preamble  of  the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, where the rule of law and universal values are in the 
spotlight. In the heart of the EU's activities lies the creation of "an area of freedom, security and  
justice". The Charter has become legally binding and the protection of fundamental rights in the EU 
"has been taken to a new level" but a regular examination whether the Member States comply in 
practice with the goals set by the treaty, to which they are bound and to what extent, should be a 
high priority.  In  the situation where one Member State  is  repeatedly violating the fundamental 
principles and objectives of the Union, for instance by infringing citizens' rights, harsh measures 
51 Majone G. 2009:22-35 “Europe As The Would-Be World Power: The EU At Fifty”, Cambridge University Press
52 "Wenn der Euro scheitert, scheitert Europa" as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated
53 Demos is Britain’s leading cross-party think-tank http://www.demos.co.uk/about 
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should be introduced. Article 6 of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides for EU liability if it fails to 
protect human rights and safeguard democracy throughout its jurisdiction, connects the EU, the 
Council of Europe and the ECtHR. It remains to be seen whether the individual holders of Greek 
sovereign  bonds  and  the  Cypriot  savers  who  suffered  a  “haircut”  on  their  property  will  be 
compensated for their losses in their respective national courts or the ECtHR. 
Finally,  the European Union Agency for Fundamental  Rights54 should be enhanced with 
extra powers. Qualitative and quantitative data should be gathered and analyzed on a regular basis, 
measuring the respect for fundamental rights and enforcement of democratic commitments in each 
Member State of the Union. The institutions of the EU should observe this process and experts  
should assist in the imposition of this regulatory framework. 
As many as 146 million people could be at risk of poverty by 2025, if austerity in the EU 
continues at the same pace, the international aid group Oxfam55 reported in September 2012. This is 
the  latest  project  to  a  growing  debate  in  the  EU on  the  impact  of  its  crisis-fighting  austerity 
measures,  and  whether  it  should  continue  further  with  fiscal  consolidation  or  growth-boosting 
spending.  Nobel  laureate  and  former  World  Bank  economist  Joseph  Stiglitz,  who  wrote  the 
foreword of this report, stated: “The wave of economic austerity that has swept Europe ... is at risk  
of doing serious and permanent damage to the continent’s long-cherished social model”. The report 
upholds that it could take as much as 25 years for Europeans to regain “the living standards they 
enjoyed five years ago”. 
In conclusion, it should be every EU citizen's and political leader's commitment to fulfill 
what Natalia Alonso, the head of Oxfam’s EU Office invited:
"We’re  calling  on European governments  to  champion a  new economic  and social  model  that  
invests in people, strengthens democracy and pursues fair taxation,”...“Governments could raise  
billions for public services, such as health and education, by taxing the wealthiest and cracking  
down on tax dodging”.
54 established in 2007
55 Oxfam is an international confederation of 17 organizations networked together in more than 90 countries, as part of 
a global movement for change, to build a future free from the injustice of poverty http://www.oxfam.org/en/about 
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• Greece – Memorandum for economic and financial policies, May 3, 2010
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• The statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank
• Law 4050/2012
• Greek Constitution as amended in 2008
• Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I)
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amending  Directive  2004/39/EC  on  markets  in  financial  instruments,  as  regards  the  
implementing powers conferred on the Commission (MiFID)
• ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings on Jurisdiction of the Centre
• European Convention on Human Rights
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APPENDIX
EUROPEAN COUNCIL
THE PRESIDENT
Brussels, 25 May 2010
PCE 104/10
Opening address by Herman Van Rompuy, 
President of the European Council, 
to the Brussels Economic Forum 2010
"Lessons from a crisis"
Brussels, 25 May 2010
In September 1929, a New York investment firm placed an advertisement to attract savings. 
It briefly told the history of the Mississippi Bubble -- wild speculation in the early 18th century – 
and then said: "Today, it is inexcusable to buy a 'bubble' -- inexcusable because unnecessary. For 
today  every  investor  has  at  his  disposal  facilities  for  obtaining  the  facts."  These  facts  would 
substitute the "sound principles of investment" for the "hazards of speculation", so said the ad. The 
men and women who believed this and rushed in to invest their savings -- they were disappointed 
quickly, just one month later, by the great October 1929 stock market crash. 
It  is  a  pleasure  and an  honour  to  give  the  opening address  of  this  2010 edition  of  the 
Brussels Economic Forum. Judging by the program, it  looks like you are going to have a very 
stimulating day and a half. 
Some of you may recognise the advertisement I just referred to. One finds it in the recent 
book by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial 
Folly (2009).  The book is  widely acclaimed and rightly so.  The title  is  ironic,  of  course.  The 
author’s central claim is that the risk of financial crises has been systematically underestimated 
throughout history, until today. Every generation of economists and policy makers believes it has 
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ended thecycle of boom and bust. The reasons and words may vary, from "today we have the facts" 
(in 1929), to "now we have securitized debt" (in 2007). But the refrain is the same: "This time is 
different".  Every  generations  believes  that.  And,  well…,  more  than  one  generation  has  been 
disappointed in this  belief.  The book surely makes for sobering reading. Why do I  mention it? 
Because it helps us to put things into perspective. In the light of this long history of financial follies, 
one can "de-dramatise" today's discussion on the public debt crisis.
Accidentally,  the  recent  events  have  put  into  question  the  very title  of  this  conference: 
"strategies for a post-crisis world"… That looks a bit optimistic today. Are we already after the 
crisis? Maybe not. Or not yet. I prefer to speak about the ‘post-recession’. By all means, the timing 
of today's and tomorrow's Forum is apt: after a tense period, culminating in the weekend of 7 to 9  
May, the European Union has itself bought time. Time for reflection and time for action. Let us use 
it well -- politicians, economists -- all of us. Before we are ‘post-crisis”, we need to get there. 
Therefore I should like today to share some thoughts on the current crisis of public debt. I 
will do so in three points.
Firstly: how did the European Union deal with this crisis?
Second issue: what lessons should we draw from this crisis, in terms of economic policy?
Third issue: what lessons should we draw, in general political terms? What does it mean for the 
state of European integration?
A final preliminary remark. We are gathered here at an economic forum. So I could talk balance of 
payments, and balance of trade, and structural growth.
However, in front of such a distinguished audience of experts, this could be inappropriate. 
As the saying goes: "You don't serve pasta to the Italians"…! I do abstain from serving "pasta" with 
a little regret, though. As you may know, I am an economist by training; my first jobs were at the 
Belgian Central Bank and teaching economics at the university. Then, however, I went into politics. 
To  continue  the  cooking  metaphor,  I  left  the  pasta  for  "sausage  making"...  (For  those  of  you 
unfamiliar with the image, it was Bismarck who once said: "Laws are like sausages, it is better not 
to see them made.")
Let’s get to the first issue: how did the European Union deal with the crisis? I should like to 
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focus on the facts, not to the perception. In my judgment the EU did reasonably well. We stumbled,  
but  we  did  not  fall.  The  EU  works  under  a  lot  of  political  constraints.  These  are  often 
underestimated by outside observers. In any political system, there is a difference between coming 
up with a plan, and getting it adopted by a parliament and accepted by the public. (Just think of the 
American health care plan!)
In the European Union, the difficulty is even bigger. We are not a single state. In the case of 
the Euro zone, we are dealing with 16 governments and 16 parliaments, with very different public 
opinions. Moreover, at the start of the Greek crisis, we did not have the instruments. The Treaties 
don’t provide instruments to deal with a debt crisis. The founders of the Economic and Monetary 
Union were convinced that the Stability and Growth Pact would suffice to keep budget deficits low. 
The  implementation  was  deficient.  Member  States  gave  the  wrong  signal  in  2005  when  they 
softened the Pact. Economic growth and the absence of significant ‘spreads’ worked as a drug. 
Notwithstanding the absence of instruments, we were able to develop them. We built a lifeboat at  
sea. Anybody who ever tried, knows this is not easy!
From the start, the European Council had a double guideline: responsibility and solidarity. 
These were the two guiding principles to which all Heads of State and Government of the Euro 
zone subscribed. Responsibility, by the Greek government. Solidarity, by the others, in order to 
protect Greece (and indirectly themselves). I also stress that, during the process, we kept all our 
commitments towards Greece. Let me recall the facts:
• In February, we agreed on the principle to take action to safeguard the euro's stability and to help 
Greece.
• In March, we agreed on the mechanism.
• It was only in April, on the 23rd, that Greece for the first time asked for support.
• A week later, on 2 May, a deal was reached, and one week later, on 7 May, the support
mechanism was effectively triggered.
All along, the European Union did what it promised, and when it was needed.
Now, in the final stage, between 2 and 7 May, we were no longer just talking about Greece, 
but about the risk of contagion to other countries. It was a very serious threat to the stability of the 
euro and the financial system. That’s why we decided, in a special meeting of the Heads of State  
and Government from the Euro zone on 7 May, to use “the full range of means available” to protect 
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the euro. These were no empty words. During the following 48 hours, all institutions and Member 
States assumed their responsibility:
• The Commission rapidly made a proposal;
• The finance ministers agreed on an impressive safety mechanism for the Euro zone – the 750 
billion euro package --, before the opening of the Asian markets;
• The Central Bank, independently, changed its policy with regard to sovereign bonds;
• Two Member States immediately announced extra cuts to reduce their deficits.
One should consider these actions as one, common European effort. Taken as a whole, they 
clearly show the Union is able to act. To act decisively. I think this was widely recognised. Still, one 
hears  critical  assessments.  For  instance,  the  EU  was  only  able  to  act  when  confronted  with 
imminent collapse. Or, the EU only bought time. Listening to some commentators, one gets the 
impression we are living the biggest crisis since the Second World War, or even the First one. 
Last week, one observer urged European leaders to use the Churchillian language of “blood, 
toil, tears and sweat” in order to convey a sense of urgency. Well, it is not exactly the outbreak of 
the Second World War... We are not in the monetary Armageddon. Verbal inflation will not bring 
back confidence. It is a political duty to keep a sense of proportion. We are certainly in a critical  
moment; one can call it "unprecedented" and "historical". But crises are always unprecedented, that 
is the whole point. Therefore I am glad that the EU has been able to deal with this one. It took time, 
the coordination was difficult, but it is the result that counts.
Another line of critique dismisses the safety mechanism for the euro as “only buying time”. 
This disdain is odd. In economic thinking, time is a cost. But not so in politics! In politics, like in  
human life in general, time is the most precious good. Politicians try to shape it, in order to get  
things done.
Every radical change, such as Greece is now embarking upon, requires time and respite; a 
temporary protection from the pressure of events,  in  order  to  better  face them afterwards.  The 
Union has now created this breathing space,  which did not exist before.  The safety mechanism 
gives the Greeks time to put the house in order. Therefore the loans are conditional. Conditionality 
is key in this matter. I am confident they will surmount this crisis. Not only the Greeks must use this 
time. So should the Union as a whole. 
As President of the European Council, I urge all actors to focus now on the steps ahead. I 
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just said that during the crisis, we stumbled, but did not fall. In the situation, that was not bad. 
However, we have now reached the point where stumbling itself could be dangerous. I think we are 
all aware of that. Therefore we need prudence as much as ‘courage’. The next steps will determine 
the fate of our Economic and Monetary Union.
This brings me to the second issue of my talk: What lessons should we draw from this crisis, 
in terms of economic policy? Quite clearly, the key priorities are fiscal sustainability, avoiding that  
public debt spins out of control, and being able to deal more effectively with financial  trouble. 
Simply put, our two main missions are improving crisis prevention and crisis management. In fact, 
these are the two subjects of the Task Force on Economic Governance which the European Council 
has asked me to chair. I should like to take this opportunity to briefly comment upon it. This will 
give you the state of play on the issue. The Task Force consists of representatives of all 27 Member 
States - mostly Ministers of Finance -, plus Commissioner Rehn from the Commission, President 
Trichet  from the Central  Bank and Prime-minister  Juncker  from the Eurogroup, and myself  as 
chairman. All key actors are around the table. 
Last  Friday  we  had  our  first  meeting.  I  could  feel  a  sense  of  urgency  and  a  spirit  of 
cooperation. Everyone shared the will to go forward together. I was impressed how quickly the state 
of thinking has evolved on the issue of public debt in a few weeks, not just in Brussels but also in 
the  capitals.  We  hope  to  conclude  a  comprehensive  agreement  in  October.  In  view  of  our 
fundamental and farreaching purpose, that shows a certain ambition. We already found agreement 
on the four main objectives. 
Firstly, we should reach greater budgetary discipline. All agreed on the need to strengthen 
the Stability and Growth Pact. A lot of proposals are on the table. They concern both the preventive 
and the corrective side of the Pact. I will not go into the details here, but they include stronger  
warning procedures and new types of sanctions. In the context of a stronger Stability Pact, one 
aspect  may be  of  particular  interest  to  you,  as  economists.  So  far,  the  focus  has  been  almost 
exclusively  on  the  maximum public  annual  deficit,  the  famous  3  percent  of  GDP.  Much  less 
attention has been paid to the level of public debt (the famous 60 percent). Public debt in the Euro 
zone is now 85 pct on average. It is as if we were looking at Member States’ fiscal positions through 
the  keyhole  of  the  annual  deficit,  forgetting  the  bay window of  public  debt.  This  needs  to  be 
corrected.
I add another remark. The Keynesian approach during the recession of 2008-2009 became in 
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countries  all  over  the  world  an  excuse  not  to  attach  sufficient  attention  to  sustainable  public 
finances. As Belgian prime minister, I was rather cautious. In 2010, Belgium will have the lowest  
budget deficit in Western Europe.
The  second  objective  is  a  reduction  of  the  divergences  in  competitiveness  between  the 
Member States. This is vital, especially for the euro area. The Stability Pact remains the corner 
stone of European economic policy coordination. However, sound budgetary policies are necessary 
but not sufficient to ensure competitiveness. We could have known this from the start, but it took 
this crisis to hammer down the point.
Over  the  years,  competitiveness  in  some  Member  States  has  improved  thanks  to  wage 
moderation  and  productivity  improvement.  Others  have  accumulated  important  losses  of 
competitiveness and balance of payments deficits on the current account. If one had taken a close 
look at  the figures  of these current  accounts,  the problems of some countries could have been 
predicted. But this was not a ‘Maastricht’ criterium.
These imbalances  are  a  particular  problem for members of the Euro area.  Their  loss of 
competitiveness can easily be covered -- until it is too late. Countries can no longer devalue, but 
keep advantage  of  low interest  rates.  In  this  respect,  membership  of  the Euro zone acted as  a 
"sleeping pill" for some economies. Nobody wants a "rude awakening" by the market forces. One 
idea  therefore  is  to  develop  indicators  of  competitiveness.  They  should  function  as  an  early 
warning, a wake-up call. Some have proposed to go further, with corrective measures for those who 
do not act when the red light flashes. Now, going from crisis prevention to crisis management, I 
come to the third and fourth objectives on which our Task Force broadly agrees. 
Third objective: We need to have an effective crisis mechanism in order to be able to deal 
with problems such as those of today in the Eurozone. The general crisis mechanism that was put 
into place two weeks ago (i.e. the 750 billion euro package), will function for three years. The 
question is whether, and if so under which conditions, it  should be developed into a permanent 
fixture of the system.
Fourth objective: We need to strengthen the institutional cooperation and coordination, in 
order to be able to act quicker and more efficiently when problems arise. In the Greek crisis, we did 
build a lifeboat at sea, but we can clearly not go on improvising like this. Therefore I intend to put  
proposals on the table of the Task Force for better coordination between the main actors.
These are our four central priorities.
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A concluding remark on these economic policy lessons. A quick-witted mind might wonder, 
if you have perfect crisis prevention, why would you need better crisis management? Would it not  
be  smarter  to  put  all  the  cards  on  prevention?  I  do  not  think  so.  Again,  crises  are  essentially 
unpredictable. Surely in the world of credit and financing, where credibility and confidence play 
key roles. Confidence is about emotions and psychology, just as much as about market value and 
economics. This should imply some modesty. To quote Rogoff and Reinhardt once more:
“Economists do not have a terribly good idea of what kind of events shift confidence and how to 
concretely assess the confidence vulnerability.”
In short: if we are serious about a European economic policy, we should do whatever we can 
to avoid the type of crisis we already know. That is what we did during the credit crisis of 2008-
2009, when we avoided all the mistakes that were made in the 1930’s because we knew them (for 
instance: this time, unlike then, we stayed away from protectionism, by safeguarding the European 
internal market). But we should also be able to deal with unforeseen circumstances. Not if, but 
when they arrive.
I now come to the third and final issue I should like to address. What lessons can we draw 
from the crisis in political terms? What does it mean for the state of European integration? It is a 
huge subject of course, so just some quick remarks. In a way, the old cliché holds: every crisis is an 
opportunity.  It  creates a  possibility to act.  To do things we were unable to do.  Today,  one can 
already feel acceleration in the pace of events. But here again, a sense of proportion is in order. I do 
not belong to those who are cheering with a European flag and who are almost thanking the markets 
for  obliging  the  European  Union  to  take  a  step  forward  on  political  integration.  European 
integration is not a goal in itself. I would rather not have had this crisis, and I am sure the Greek 
people and most taxpayers in the Union would agree.
However, now that we are at this juncture, as a Union, it would be irresponsible not to draw 
the right lessons. That is  what the work of the Task Force is  about.  Beyond the specific rules, 
however, we are clearly confronted with a tension within the system, the infamous dilemma of 
being a monetary union and not a full-fledged economic and political union. This tension has been 
there since the single currency was created. It was known to the diplomats and to the experts; it 
proved ammunition to euro’s critics. However, the general public was not really made aware of it  
(at  least  not  by  those  responsible).  The  dilemma  remained  invisible.  Nobody  ever  told  the 
proverbial man in the street that sharing a single currency was not just about making peoples’ lives 
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easier when doing business or travelling abroad, but also about being directly affected by economic 
developments  in  the neighbouring  countries.  That  being in  the “Euro zone” means,  monetarily 
speaking, being part of one “Euro land”. Today, people are discovering what a “common destiny” in 
monetary matters means. They are discovering that the euro affects their pensions, savings, and 
jobs, their very daily life. It hurts. 
In my view, this growing public awareness is a major political development. It forces the 
governments  to  act.  What  will  they  do?  We  will  take  those  steps  towards  stronger  economic 
coordination, as currently under discussion in the Task Force. It is necessary and it will be done. 
Moving forward will be delicate, because beyond the economics, fundamental political issues are at  
stake. Take the discussion on public deficits: all Member States want the others to play by the rules, 
they ask for sanctions, but at the same time they are not per se willing to have “Brussels” look 
anytime into their books...
I expect the steps forward to allow us to better deal with the fundamental dilemma, but not 
to eliminate it. Getting rid of it would require some federal jump, in which the centre would take 
precedence over the parts; that is not going to happen. Instead, Europe will stay in the realm of 
squaring the circle, between the Union and the Member States – but no doubt at a higher level! In 
this respect, the European Council has an important role to play. Alongside the Commission and the 
Central Bank, it is responsible for the Union’s economic governance. As the body where the Heads 
of State and Government of the Member-States gather to deal with common European issues, it is 
particularly capable of squaring this circle. 
It  can assume responsibility for European decisions in front  of national parliaments and 
public opinions, not at a technical level, but at a political one. In the first proposals on the table of 
the Task Force, one sees other attempts to square the circle. Take the German idea to integrate the 
European deficit and debt rules into national legislation: it is a way of making visible that European 
rules are not just “from Brussels” – and therefore easy scapegoats –, but that they are self-imposed 
by each Member-State to the benefit of all.  The same is true of the suggestion to hold national 
finance ministers accountable in their own national parliaments for the examination of the stability 
programs of their Euro zone partners. This may have disadvantages, but it would make visible that 
within the Euro zone, economic and fiscal policies of the partners are not just a matter of foreign 
affairs and old style financial diplomacy, but that they are, in a way, domestic affairs. These are 
encouraging shifts. 
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Let me conclude with the most important point. It brings us beyond the crisis, back to the 
main issue of your Forum. The point is quite simply this: we cannot solve our budgetary problems 
without more structural economic growth. Without growth, we risk a negative spiral. In the short 
term, the acceleration of fiscal consolidation will hamper growth in the Euro zone as a whole only 
marginally.  I  am  even  convinced  that  lower  deficits  will  enhance  consumer  confidence  and 
stimulate economic growth.
Moreover, the EU 2020 strategy remains absolutely important. The fiscal strategy has to 
prioritise  R&D,  innovation  and  education.  They  are  key  for  the  future,  for  increasing 
competitiveness. Therefore political  leaders will be confronted with a reform programme in the 
budgetary field as in the socio-economic domains. All this will not be easy to achieve, but it is vital.  
The European Union and all Member States still have a long way ahead, but I am confident that all  
have the political will to do what needs to be done.
_____________________
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